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THE U.C.C. MERCHANT SECTIONS:
REASONABLE COMMERCIAL STANDARDS
OF FAIR DEALING IN THE TRADES
I. INTRODUCTION*
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) applies to
transactions in goods regardless of the status of the parties.' Fourteen
sections of article 2, however, apply stricter standards of conduct to
merchants.2 An issue in each of these sections, therefore, is whether
one or more of the parties to the transaction are merchants. According
to U.C.C. section 2-104(1):
Merchant means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself3 out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved
in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as hav-
ing such knowledge or skill.4
The interpretation of this definition has sharply divided courts5
* The author thanks Professor Martin A. Frey for suggesting this topic and for his encour-
agement during the completion of this paper.
1. "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods."
U.C.C. § 1-102. All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code sections and comments refer to
the 1972 Official Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2. See U.C.C. §§ 2-103(l)(b), 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207(2), 2-209(2), 3-312(3), 2-314, 2-
327(l)(c), 2-402(2), 2-403(2), 2-509(3), 2-603(l), 2-605(l)(b), 2-609(2). In addition, the term
merchant appears in U.C.C. § 7-210. Merchant status also has importance in article 9 of the Code
in that only a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes goods free of an article 9 security
interest. U.C.C. § 9-307. This requires that the buyer purchase the disputed goods in good faith.
U.C.C. § 1-201(9). Good faith in the case of a merchant requires "honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b). E.g., Tumber v.
Automation Design & Mfg. Corp., 130 NJ. Super. 5, 324 A.2d 602 (1974).
3. "[W]ords of the masculine gender include the feminine and the neuter, and when the
sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may refer to any gender." U.C.C. § 1-102(5)(b).
4. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (footnote added).
5. Compare, e.g., Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965) with
Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 52 (v.D. Wis. 1976). In Cook Grains, Inc.
the court concluded that, since the Code merchant definition has its "roots in the 'law merchant'
concept of a professional in business," merchant should be given its plain and ordinary meaning
as interpreted in pre-Code case law-a professional trader. 239 Ark. at -, 395 S.W.2d at 557
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and commentators,6 as has which criteria listed in the definition apply
to each merchant section. This division stems from a misunderstanding
of Code policies. 7 As a result of such misunderstanding, some persons
who ought to be held to merchant status and standards are not; conse-
quently, Code policies are frustrated. Application of the merchant defi-
nition to a specific person depends on whether calling that person a
merchant will promote the policies which underlie, not only the entire
Code and the specific merchant section involved, but also-and prima-
rily-the merchant definition and, hence, the merchant sections as a
group.
The thesis of this comment is that the merchant sections as a group
are intended to implement the policy announced in section 2-103(l)(b)
of charging persons with reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing in their trades. If this is kept in mind, courts could be correct and
consistent in their application-or nonapplication--of the merchant la-
bel to specific persons.
That the merchant sections are intended to implement such a pol-
icy will be shown in three steps. First, the Code merchant definition in
section 2-104 will be analyzed.' That analysis will show that merchant
status results when a person holds himself out by occupation as having
knowledge of a business practice or of goods.' Second, the incorpora-
tion of the merchant definition by the fourteen merchant sections in
article 2 will be discussed.' 0 That discussion will show that, while some
merchant sections are general in nature," others are specific.12 The
specific merchant sections are those which attribute knowledge of a
(quoting from U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2). The Wisconsin court in Continental Grain, Inc., how-
ever, concluded that the Code merchant definition was intended to apply to all buyers and sellers
except the consumer purchaser. 19 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 59.
6. Compare Newell, The Merchant of Article 2, 7 VAL. L. REV. 307, 332 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Newell] with Dolan, The Merchant Class of Article 2: Farmers, Doctors, and Others, 1
WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dolan]. Newell argues that the meaning of
merchant may vary with the emphasis given to the nature and purpose of specific merchant rules
and to the circumstances of the particular situation. Hence, a person may fit the purpose of a
merchant rule, and thus be found to be a merchant, but not fit any of the criteria listed in the Code
merchant definition. By contrast, Dolan argues that the meaning of merchant varies with the
underlying reason of a particular merchant rule, but that whatever variation results from such
reason will be one of the criteria listed in the Code merchant definition.
7. See note 15 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 16-27 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 28-46 infra and accompanying text.
11. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-609(2) which provides, "Between merchants the reasonableness of
grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to
commercial standards." (Emphasis added.)
12. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 which provides, "An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a
signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable." The
19781
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specific business practice or specific knowledge of goods. The general
merchant sections apply if a person fits into any of the specific
merchant sections. While a premise of this comment is that both types
of sections charge merchants with reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in their trades, it will be pointed out that the general
merchant sections do not specify what these standards are. Thus, this
comment theorizes and will show that the general merchant sections
charge a person with reasonable conduct as measured by the usages of
his trade. The more specific merchant sections, by contrast, set out
what the reasonable commercial standards are which must be observed.
It will be shown that these specific sections charge a person with
merchant status if that person represents, by usages of his trade, that he
has the knowledge specified in the section. Therefore, in the specific
merchant sections, a person can be a merchant for purposes of one sec-
tion but a nonmerchant for another. Although the sections of a specific
nature are, to a certain extent, independent, this comment will show
that all merchant sections implement the underlying policy of holding
persons to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in their
trades. 13 In the third and last step to this analysis, the principles de-
rived from the discussion will be tested on the long standing issue of
whether a farmer fits within merchant section 2-201(2) and thus should
be labeled a merchant for purposes of that section.' 4
Two of the previously mentioned policies which underlie the en-
tire Code should be identified. Recognition of these policies is impor-
tant because promoting these policies is one of the considerations in
deciding whether to attribute merchant status in a particular situa-
tion.' 5 Section 1-102(2) lists the underlying Code policies as "to sim-
business practice to which this section refers is that of assuring, in a signed writing, that an offer
will remain open for a specific or reasonable time.
13. See notes 41-46 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 47-78 infra and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(l) which provides, "This Act shall be liberally construed to
promote its underlying purposes and policies." Comment I to this section indicates that two levels
of policy accompany each rule: "The text of each section should be read in light of the purpose
and policy of the rule in question, as [sic] also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the
language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the
purposes and policies involved." Determining the policy of a particular section requires attention
to the overall structure of the Code. As Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter of article 2, said,
"[The Code is] an integrated whole, whose parts supplement, support, mutually affect and balance
one another." I NEw YoRx REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1954, HEARINGS
ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 179 (1954) [hereinafter cited as 1 N.Y. HEARINGS].
Thus, article 1 is comprised of general definitions, such as the definition of good faith in § I-
201(19), and underlying policies such as those announced in § 1-102 which apply throughout the
Code. In addition, part 1 of each article of the Code defines terms which apply to the article
where the terms appear. The merchant definition, for example, appears in part 1 of article 2;
[Vol. 14:190
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plify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions; to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac-
tices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties." To reem-
phasize, application of the merchant definition to a specific person
should depend on whether calling that person a merchant will promote
not only these two policies and the policies behind the merchant section
involved but also the policy behind the merchant definition-to charge
persons with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in their
trades.
II. THE MERCHANT DEFINITION
Section 2-104(1) begins, "'Merchant' means a person who deals in
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge."' 16 Despite the seeming alternative language of this
section, the following analysis will reveal that merchant status stems
from any holding oneself out, by occupation, as having knowledge. 17
A source of ambiguity in the definition is the recurring word or.
In one context or means "instead of," linking disjunctive expressions,
as in "sink or swim. ' 18 Or, however, may also signify "in other
words," linking equivalent expressions, as in "violin or fiddle."' 19 The
first or in the merchant definition means "in other words." The use of
the word otherwise following or signals this meaning because otherwise
implies that a person who deals in goods of the kind is a person who by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction.2' If such an impli-
cation is accurate, then holding oneself out by occupation as having
knowledge or skill is the characteristic of "a person who deals in goods
of the kind"2&-a dealer-which makes him a merchant. Official com-
ment 2 to section 2-104 also supports this reading by explaining that
merchant status is based on specialized knowledge, thus implying that
dealers represent that they have specialized knowledge. In addition,
merchant status is attributed to persons who hire others who represent
therefore, it applies throughout article 2 whenever the word merchant is used. See U.C.C. § 2-
104(1).
16. U.C.C. § 2-104(l) (emphasis added).
17. Cf. Dolan, supra note 6, at 3 (who distinguishes holding oneself out and dealing).
18. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1585 (3d ed. 1961). If or is used in § 2-
104(1) only ;n its disjunctive sense, the section could be comprised of 17 theoretically variant
meanings of merchant. Cf. Newell, supra note 6, at 316 (where nine of the meanings are listed).
19. WEBSTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1585 (3d ed. 1961).
20. See Dolan, supra note 6, at 3.
21. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
19781
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by occupation that they have knowledge of practices or of goods.22 If
dealers are not among those who by their occupations hold themselves
out as having knowledge or skill, it would be unjustifiable to attribute
merchant status to a person who hires a dealer. Hence, merchant status
stems from holding oneself out, by occupation, as having knowledge or
skill.
The next or in the merchant definition links the words knowledge
and skill: "'Merchant' means . . . a person who by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill.' 23 This raises the possi-
bility that a person may be a merchant by representing that he has a
skill as opposed to having knowledge. Any theoretical distinction, how-
ever, is immaterial since the merchant sections recognize nonspecial-
ized skills that almost everyone possesses, such as ability to answer a
letter.24 Thus, if a person has the knowledge specified in the merchant
sections, that person should have no trouble applying the knowledge to
exercise the skill. Moreover, comment 2 states that merchant status is
based on specialized knowledge, not skill.25
This knowledge, according to the definition, may be of business
"practices or goods. 26 Which aspect of the definition, goods or prac-
tices, will suffice to establish merchant status in a particular merchant
section, the definition does not indicate. If the wrong aspect is chosen
and applied, the merchant definition will be wrongly applied and Code
policies will be frustrated. The focus of the discussion, therefore, must
now shift from the definition in section 2-104(1) to the fourteen
merchant sections of article 2.27 The issue becomes how the merchant
22. Id
23. Id (emphasis added).
24. U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2.
25. Id
26. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (emphasis added).
27. Continuing with the analysis of or in the merchant definition of § 2-104(1), it must be
noted that or also links a person "who. . . by his occupation holds himself out as having knowl-
edge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction" and "to whom such
knowledge may be attributed by his hiring of an agent or broker or other intermediary." U.C.C. §
2-104(1). In this context, or means instead of, linking disjoint expressions. That is, merchants by
occupation hold themselves out as having knowledge of a business practice or of goods, or, if such
persons do not represent by occupation that they have such knowledge, they employ those who do.
Either way, merchants status stems from a person's holding himself out by occupation as having
knowledge either of a business practice or of goods, depending on the requirements of the dis-
puted merchant section. The last two usages of or in the merchant definition link broker, agent,
and other intermediary. Other implies that brokers and agents are examples of intermediaries,
hence or in this context means in other words. Therefore, merchant status stems from holding
oneself out by occupation as having knowledge of a business practice or of goods depending on
the merchant section in question. Aside from the potential ambiguity of or in the merchant defini-
tion, an additional problem of deciphering the meaning of merchant from the article 2 definitional
sections is that some merchant sections use the phrase "between merchants" as a specially defined
[Vol. 14:190
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sections incorporate the merchant definition.
III. How THE MERCHANT SECTIONS INCORPORATE THE MERCHANT
DEFINITION
A. The Independence of Specfc Goods and Practices Sections
Comment 2 to section 2-104(1) groups the merchant sections into
three categories.28  The first category is comprised of sections which
base merchant status on specialized knowledge of business practices.29
Another category comprises sections that base merchant status on spe-
cialized knowledge of goods.3" The third category is made up of sec-
tions of a more general nature, such that if a person is a merchant
under any of the goods or business practices sections within the first
two categories, that person is a merchant for purposes of the more gen-
eral sections within the third category."
term. According to § 2-104(3), between merchants means that both parties to the transaction are
"chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants." Most courts have ignored § 1-204(3),
assuming that between merchants means that both parties to the transaction must be merchants.
28. According to U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2:
The professional status under the definition may be based upon specialized knowledge as
to goods, specialized knowledge as to business practices, or specialized knowledge as to
both and which kind of specialized knowledge may be sufficient to establish the
merchant status is indicated by the nature of the provisions.
29. See, eg., U.C.C. § 2-205 which provides, "An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in
a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for
lack of consideration." The business practice which § 2-205 describes is that of assuring, in a
signed writing, that an offer will remain open for a length of time. The policy of this section is "to
limit the power of an offeror to withdraw his firm offer in circumstances in which the offeree
reasonably relies on the offer's firmness!' J. WHITE, & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 33 (1972) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS]. Com-
ment 2 to § 2-205 states the policy slightly differently as "to give effect to the deliberate intention
of a merchant to make a current firm offer binding." Section 2-205 brings the Code in line with the
business practice of relying on firm offers. At common law, an offer was revocable unless sup-
ported by consideration. Finding the common law too harsh and contrary to business practices,
courts modified the rule by applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the option promise or,
in the absence of an express option promise, to an implied option promise. See, e.g., Drennan v.
Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra, at 33.
Other practice sections include § 2-201(2) (Statute of Frauds), § 2-207(2) (confirmatory memo-
randa), and § 2-209 (modification of contracts).
30. Eg., U.C.C. § 2-312(3). This goods subsection accords merchant status to a person who
by his occupation of selling goods represents that he has knowledge that the goods infringe on no
patent or trademark. A person who is classified a merchant under § 2-312(3), however, should not
be classified as a merchant under § 2-314, another goods subsection, merely because he held him-
self out by occupation as having knowledge that no infringement existed. Section 2-314 accords
merchant status to a person who, by his occupation of selling goods, represents that the goods sold
are of merchantible quality, ie., that the goods will pass without objection in the seller's trade.
Surely a person may represent, by occupation, that he has knowledge of no patent or trademark
infringement of the goods he sells without representing that the goods will pass without objection
in his trade. Other goods sections include § 2-314 (warranty of merchantability), § 2-410(2) (reten-
tion of possession by sellers), and § 2-403(2) (entrusting of possession of goods).
31. According to U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2, the more general group of sections "applies to
6
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Consideration of the classification scheme set forth in comment 2
leads to the conclusion that the goods sections and the practices sec-
tions are independent of each other. This conclusion is reached after
an examination of the sections themselves. First, the general merchant
sections incorporate both the goods and practices aspect of the
merchant definition.32 Conversely, the more specific merchant sections,
whether concerning goods or practices, incorporate but one aspect of
the definition. For example, to be a merchant under a goods section, a
person must by occupation hold himself out as having knowledge of
goods. Thus, the goods sections incorporate the goods aspect of the
definition. Similarly, the business practice sections incorporate the
business practice aspect of the definition.
Examination of the classification scheme of comment 2 also
reveals that, while a person may represent by his holding of a particular
occupation that he has knowledge under one of the specific merchant
sections, his holding of the same occupation may not represent posses-
sion of knowledge under another of the specific sections. In other
words, not only may a person fit the section 2-104(1) merchant defini-
tion and still be a nonmerchant as to particular merchant sections, but
also a person may be a merchant under one particular section and not
under another.33 Thus, it follows that a person who qualifies as a
merchant in one section which requires knowledge of goods should not
automatically be classified as a merchant in the other goods sections.
Nor should a person who qualifies as a merchant because of his knowl-
edge of one business practice automatically be classified a merchant
where other business practices are concerned.
The independence of the goods and practice sections is further
supported by the fact that merchant sections can be varied by usages of
persons who are merchants under either the 'practices' or 'goods' aspect of the definition of
merchant." General sections include § 2-103(l)(b) (good faith), § 2-327(l)(c) and § 2-605 (respon-
sibility of merchant buyer to follow seller's instructions), § 2-509 (risk of loss), and § 2-609 (ade-
quate assurance of performance).
32. See U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2.
33. Karl Llewellyn recognized the truth of this statement and argued that a contrary conclu-
sion was unreasonable:
In regard to the warranty of merchantability, it is a question of knowledge of goods, but
in regard to those sections of the Act which have to do with. . . a merchant's obligation
to answer his correspondence, the matter has to do with practices.
In regard to the matter... of instructions on rejection, I would say that it was
mixed. Certainly the man ought to understand reshipping practice, but if he doesn't
understand how to handle a particular type of goods involved, he isn't under the obliga-
tion to follow instructions. They aren't reasonable under those circumstances.
I N.Y. HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 168.
[Vol. 14:190
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trade.34 Section 1-205(2) provides: "A usage of trade is any practice or
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vo-
cation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with
respect to the transaction in question." A usage of trade is, in other
words, a representation by occupation of knowledge of a practice or
method of dealing that justifies reliance on it by others.
That merchant sections can be varied by usages of trade indicates
that occupations differ in the kinds of a specialized knowledge that
those engaged in such occupations hold themselves out as having. The
presence of a usage of trade different from one specified in a merchant
section renders the section inapplicable. Thus, if a usage of trade of a
certain occupation varies from one specified in a merchant section, the
parties to the transaction are not merchants for purposes of that partic-
ular section. As Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter of article 2, noted,
it would be unreasonable to accord merchant status to a person under a
merchant section if the knowledge specified in the section was not part
of that person's occupation, a usage of his trade.35 In that case, the
person would not be holding himself out by occupation as having the
knowledge specified in the merchant section in question. Therefore, it
can be seen that merchant status stems from particular usages of
trade,36 from holding oneself out by occupation as having particular
34. An underlying Code policy is freedom of contract. See note 16 supra and accompanying
text. According to § 1-102(3), "The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement."
Agreement is defined in § 1-201(3) as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language
or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade." Thus,
§ 2-314(3) provides that warranties other than the implied warranty of merchantability may arise
from usage of trade, and § 2-316(3) provides that the implied warranty of merchantability can be
excluded by usage of trade. Most merchant sections are variable by usage of trade, though not
expressly. Eg., U.C.C. § 2-207(2). See also U.C.C. §§ 1-102(3), 1-102(4).
Section 1-102(3) sets out the exceptions to the Code's general freedom of contract policy.
That section states, "[Tlhe obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed
by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement." Since good faith and reasonableness may not
be disclaimed by agreement, the drafters of sections such as 2-314 and 2-316 must have had in
mind usages of trade different from those specified in the more specific merchant sections. Other-
wise, these sections would not be variable by agreement.
It should be noted that § 2-205, unlike other merchant sections, cannot be made less strict by
agreement of the parties. Comment 2 to § 2-205 states, "[D]espite settled courses of dealing or
usages of the trade whereby firm offers are made by oral communication and relied upon without
more evidence, such offers remain revocable under this Article since authentication by a writing is
the essence of this section."
35. 1 N.Y. HEARrNGS, supra note 15, at 168.
36. Equating merchant status to usages of trade is supported by comment 1 to § 2-104, which
provides, "[P]rofessionals in a given field require special and clear rules.... [Article 2] adopts a
policy of expressly stating rules applicable 'between merchants' and 'as against a merchant.' "
Merchant status results from holding oneself out by occupation. This representation by occupa-
tion results from a "practice or method of dealing having such regularity in a trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. § 1-205.
Some merchant sections, therefore, codify certain usages of trade. Such codification was re-
8
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knowledge of goods or of business practices.
Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry37 illustrates this premise. In that case a
rancher sold cattle infected with brucellosis. In the usual case, section
2-31438 holds the merchant seller to an implied warranty that the goods
sold are merchantable. The court, however, held that section 2-314 was
inapplicable because of a usage of trade in the cattle industry in New
Mexico that a knowledgeable cattle buyer, relying entirely on his own
judgment, takes the animals as he finds them.39 In other words, the
seller was not a merchant for purposes of section 2-314 because he did
not hold himself out by occupation as having knowledge that the cattle
were merchantable.40
To repeat, occupations differ in the kinds of specialized knowledge
that those engaged in such occupations hold themselves out as having.
Therefore, while merchant status stems from holding oneself out by
occupation as having knowledge, whether that knowledge must be of a
quired because the usages differ from common law. Not to sanction them would make them
unenforceable. See, e.g., Ozier v. Haines, 411 M11. 60, 103 NE.2d 485 (1952). Code drafters, thus,
sought to promote the underlying Code policy of permitting the continued expansion of commer-
cial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties." U.C.C. § 1-102(2).
37. 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972). Cf. Dolan, supra note 6, at 29.
38. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) provides in part: "Unless excluded or modified. . . . a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind.
39. 470 F.2d at 908.
40. The courts have consistently refused to find liability under § 2-314 where the seller is
engaged in an isolated sale. The implied warranty of merchantability does not arise in such case,
these courts hold, because one sale is insufficient to establish a usage of trade. In Sieman v. Alden,
34 1. App. 3d 961,341 N.E.2d 713 (1975), for example, the plaintiff-buyer of an automated multi-
rip saw sued the defendant-seller for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Plaintiff
was injured when a cant of wood exploded while being fed through the saw. Plaintiff contended
that defendant was a merchant for purposes of§ 2-314 because he held himself out by occupation
as having knowledge of how to use the saw. The court, however, was unimpressed with the plain-
tifs argument. It found that the mere running of a saw mill did not mean that one was in the
business of selling saws. The court cited comment 3 to § 2-314 in support of its holding: "A person
making an isolated sale of goods is not a 'merchant' within the meaning of the scope of [Section 2-
314] and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply." 34 Ill. App. 3d at -, 341 N.E.2d at
715. The conclusion which may be drawn from this case is that an isolated sale is not enough to
produce merchant status in that a person engaged in an isolated sale does not represent by his
occupation that the goods sold are merchantable.
A case based on similar reasoning is Samson v. Reising, 62 Wis. 2d 698, 215 N.W.2d 662
(1974). That case involved the sale of food by band mothers at a fund-raising luncheon. The food
was contaminated. The court refused to accord merchant status to the band mothers for the pur-
pose of bringing them within § 2-314. The court reasoned:
A commercial restauranteur as in [the cities of] either Betehia or Kresge would fall
within the definition of a merchant. Also, it should be noted that [Section 2-314] imposes
an implied warranty, not because of a sale alone, but because of the special responsibili-
ties that are placed upon a merchant who is defined as one holding himself out as having
knowledge and skill peculiar to the trade involved. The Wauwatosa Band Mothers, al-
though selling the food, were not merchants as contemplated by the statutes.
62 Wis. 2d at -, 215 N.W.2d at 669.
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business practice or of goods depends upon the requirements of the
particular merchant section in question.
B. The Underlying Policy of Merchant Sections
Concluding that the goods and practices sections are independent,
ite., that a person may be a merchant under one merchant section and
not under another, does not imply that merchant sections have no sin-
gular underlying policy or common thread. Quite the contrary. The
preceding analysis of the merchant definition has demonstrated the
overall requirement of attributable knowledge. Merchant status, re-
gardless of the merchant section involved, derives from holding oneself
out by occupation as having knowledge, either of goods or of business
practices.4" In addition, all the merchant sections are unified by the
underlying Code policy of good faith.
Section 1-201(19) imposes on all persons an obligation to perform
Code duties in good faith. This requires "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned. '42 The good faith required of a merchant,
however, is defined not only as "honesty in fact in the conduct or trans-
action concerned," but also as "the observance of reasonable commer-
cial standards of fair dealing in the trade."43 Thus, the thesis of this
comment is that the merchant sections are unified by and are intended
to implement the policy of charging merchants with "merchant good
faith," that is, with observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in their trades. This is supported by the comment following
section 1-203 which states that the merchant good faith duty is imple-
mented by courses of dealing and usages of trade. More importantly,
the comment also provides, "Particular applications of this general
principle [of merchant good faith] appear in specific provisions of the
Act such as. . .the duty of a merchant buyer who has rejected goods
to effect salvage operations (Section 2-603)." 4 Thus, some merchant
sections specify reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trades; 45 they are particular applications of the general duty of
"merchant good faith." Other merchant sections, by contrast, do not
specify what is required for "merchant good faith" but impose upon a
merchant the general duty of reasonableness as measured by commer-
41. See notes 16-27 supra and accompanying text.
42. U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
43. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b). This is one of the article 2 general merchant sections.
44. U.C.C. § 1-203, comment.
45. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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cial standards.46 Merchant status in these general merchant sections
results if a person is a merchant under any other merchant section. In
this respect, the general merchant sections are not independent of the
more specific ones.
Thus, merchant sections implement the Code policy of holding
persons to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in their
trades by holding them to the representations they make by occupation,
that is, by holding them to observance of the usages of their trades.
IV. THE FARMER AS A MERCHANT UNDER THE CODE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS EXCEPTION-MERCHANT METHODOLOGY APPLIED
The foregoing analysis of the merchant definition and discussion
of merchant sections suggests certain steps to follow in applying a
merchant section. First, determine the facts which will cause the sec-
tion to become operative and the policy considerations which are be-
hind the section.47 Then, determine the type of knowledge the
merchant section in question requires for merchant status-knowledge
of a business practice or knowledge of goods. Next, if one of the more
specific merchant sections is involved, determine the specific business
practice or knowledge of goods the merchant section requires. Finally,
examine the occupation of the person whose status is in question to
decide whether the requisite knowledge is a usage of his trade. If such
knowledge is a usage of the person's trade, then he holds himself out by
occupation as having the requisite knowledge. He is, therefore, a
merchant for purposes of the merchant section in question. Following
these four steps assures that a person who fits the merchant definition is
accorded merchant status in accordance with the purposes of a particu-
lar section and of overall Code policies.48 Again, the underlying policy
of the merchant sections is to hold persons to the reasonable commer-
cial standards of fair dealing in their trades. Merchant sections imple-
ment this policy by holding a person to the representations he makes by
occupation.49
46. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
47. "[Elach section or sub-section contains a statement of the factual conditions which are the
operative conditions on which the result stated in the rule rests." S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMER-
CIAL TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 7-8 (1968) [hereinafter cited as MENTSCHIKOFF].
Therefore, the proper approach to construing Code sections is first to discern the operative facts
which will make the rule apply and to determine whether the operative facts match the facts at
bar. Because each rule is limited to its reason and to underlying Code policies, the operative facts
do not exist where application of the rule would violate its reason.
48. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
49. Note that the standard is not one of actual knowledge. Although actual knowledge may
[Vol. 14:190
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To illustrate how the policy of holding persons to reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing in their trades is implemented in a
particular merchant section, this comment will now analyze the ques-
tion of whether a farmer is a merchant within merchant section 2-
201(2).
In July, 1974, Farmer Brown allegedly contracted by telephone to
sell Johnston Feed Service 25,000 bushels of grade 2 corn for $3.21 per
bushel with delivery to be in October, November, and December, 1974.
Farmer Brown later refused to deliver the corn, causing Johnston Feed
Service a loss of $50,375.
Johnston Feed Service filed suit50 against Brown in Wisconsin, a
state which had enacted the Uniform Commercial Code. Since article
2 of the Code defines goods to include "growing crops,"51 article 2 was
the governing law, and section 2-201, the Code's Statute of Frauds, was
controlling because the alleged sale exceeded $500.52
Relying on the Statute of Frauds, Farmer Brown argued that, even
if a contract was shown to exist, it would be unenforceable because it
was not evidenced by a writing as required by section 2-20l(l). 51 Sec-
tion 2-201(2), however, provides an exception to the writing require-
ment where the transaction is between merchants:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender
is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its
contents, it satisfies the [writing] requirements . . . against
such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is
given within 10 days after it is received.54
be present, comment 2 to § 2-104(1) indicates that a person who buys or sells as a hobby will not
necessarily be deemed a merchant due to his actual knowledge. If a person does have actual
knowledge of a business practice or of goods, however, he violates § 1-201(19), the subjective good
faith section, by representing otherwise. But see Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp.
695 (N.D. Il. 1975) in which the court stated, "in view of his actual knowledge and business
experience, no additional positive representation is necessary." Id at 699 (emphasis added).
50. Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 52 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
51. U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
52. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price
of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent
or broker. A writing is not.insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term
agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quanti-
ty of goods shown in such writing.
53. Note that Brown did not admit that a contract existed because to do so would make the
contract enforceable under § 2-201(3)(b).
54. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (emphasis added). Llewellyn explained the policy behind the "be-
tween merchants" exception to the Statute of Frauds:
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Johnston Feed Service argued in answer that the oral contract with
Brown was between merchants and that its signed confirmatory writing
sent to Brown satisfied section 2-201.
The first step in resolving the issue of whether Farmer Brown was
a merchant within section 2-201(2) is to determine the type of knowl-
edge that section 2-201(2) merchants hold themselves out as having:
knowledge of a business practice or knowledge of goods or knowledge
of both. Section 2-201(2) describes a business practice-specifically,
the business practice between merchants of sending signed, written
confirmations of oral contracts. By this business practice, if the recipi-
ent of the confirmation does not object to it, the sender may presume
that the terms of the confirmation embody the contract. Section 2-
201(2), by depriving the merchant recipient of the Statute of Frauds
defense, protects the sender's conclusion that a contract consistent with
the terms of the confirmation exists.
Did Farmer Brown, in selling his crops under a futures contract,
hold himself out by his occupation as having knowledge of this busi-
ness practice specified in section 2-201(2)? The answer to this question
depends on whether this practice is found to be a usage of his trade.
In considering this question, the court pointed out that farmers
who grow and sell crops engage extensively in futures contracting with
grain companies. The court stated, "The oral forward contract-confir-
mation practices . . . are well-known and widely-followed by farm-
ers."' 5 The court also explained the commercial necessity in the futures
market of the business practice of section 2-201(2) and noted, "The op-
eration of the commodity futures market. . . depends for its stability
upon the integrity and enforceability of contracts for purchase and re-
sale."5 6 Therefore, the court found that farmers who sell large quanti-
These days we are making contracts over the long-distance telephone as an increasingly
standard practice. Decent businessmen having made a contract over the long-distance
telephone confirm before five o'clock or close of business that day. As the statute now
stands, any crook who wishes to play it both ways against the middle has only to fail to
communicate and the other guy is stuck. He can hold him or get out according to the
market. This happy opportunity for fraud is unfortunately being indulged in to a consid-
erable extent. We think that the machinery provided in the section, [not by any means
wholly satisfactory, at least] is a safeguard against this particular type of abuse and fits
the practice of constantly closing deals at a distance, and orally.
I N.Y. HEAINGS, supra note 15, at 179.
55. Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 52, 57 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
56. Id at 60. Dolan and others have argued that farmer is too vague a designation from
which to determine whether a person fits § 2-104(1). See Dolan, supra note 6, at 18. "The term
'farmer' itself best illustrates the failure of attempting to determine merchant status by the applica-
tion of occupational terms. A farmer can be a laborer, a tenant, a rancher, a vintner, a grower, a
shepherd, a corporation, or a 'gentleman.'" Id at 22 n.161.
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ties of crops under futures contracts hold out to the grain companies
that they have knowledge of the business practice described in section
2-201(2), because the practice of oral forward contract-confirmation is
a usage of their trade.57
Proper Code construction, as previously stated,58 requires consid-
eration not only of the reason behind the specific section scrutinized
but also of the underlying Code policies announced in section 1-102.11
Holding that farmers who sell large quantities of crops are merchants
promotes the policies both behind the merchant exception to the Stat-
ute of Frauds and behind the Code's merchant sections as a whole.
The policy behind section 2-201(2) is to guard against fraud and to
foster an even distribution of risk in the market place.60 Farmers enter
into futures contracts to guard against the chance of a market decline,
but they risk a market rise. Conversely, the grain company to whom the
farmer sells his crop guards against a market rise by entering into fu-
tures contracts, but it risks a market decline. Holding these farmers to
merchant status fosters an even distribution of risk in the commodities
market; a contrary holding places an unreasonable burden on the grain
company. Holding farmers who have entered futures contracts to
merchant status, moreover, prevents the kind of fraud that section 2-
201(2) is designed to guard against. The farmer, if held not to be a
merchant, would be protected by the written memorandum of the deal
if the market falls, but he would be free to avoid the deal by claiming
the Statute of Frauds defense if the market rises. This holding, by
preventing such conduct on the part of farmers, also promotes the pol-
icy underlying the merchant sections of article 2-holding persons to
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in their
trades.
By holding a farmer who sells large quantities of crops under a
futures contract to merchant status, courts also advance the underlying
Code policy announced in section 1-102(2)(b) of permitting the contin-
ued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties. Section 2-201(2) changes former law which
recognized no "between merchants" exception to the Statute of
Frauds.6 1 In doing so, it conforms with modem business practice
57. Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 52, 59 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
58. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
59. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
60. See Kimball County Grain Coop. v. Yung, 200 Neb. 233, -, 263 N.W.2d 818, 823
(1978); and see note 54 supra. See also WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 47-48.
61. See, e.g., Ozier v. Haines, 411 Il1. 169, 103 N.E.2d 485 (1952). See also note 36 supra.
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which, in the facts discussed here, is essential to the commodities mar-
ket.
As compelling as this argument appears, however, courts are
sharply divided on whether a farmer who sells his crops annually under
a futures contract is a merchant for purposes of the "between
merchants" exception to the Statute of Frauds. The reasons given by
courts for not holding farmers to merchant status vary. Some courts
have held that farmers are not merchants because Code merchant sta-
tus has its roots in the law merchant.62 According to section 1-103,
"[u]less displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,. . . the law
merchant ... shall supplement its provisions." Farmers were ex-
cluded from law merchant status; therefore, some courts reason, they
are not part of the Code merchant class. One pre-Code definition of
merchant formulated by a court which held farmers to be non-
merchants stated: "A merchant is defined to be, in one sense, a trader,
by Webster, and by Burrill and Bouvier in their Law Dictionaries, and
a person who is engaged in farming and stock raising is not a
merchant. 63
This reasoning can be refuted by looking to the language of the
Code itself. While it is true that the Code merchant definition has its
roots in the law merchant, the Code merchant concept displaces the
narrower law merchant concept.' Section 1-103 allows the law
merchant to supplement the Code only if not "displaced by the particu-
lar provisions of this Act." Therefore, to the extent that the Code
merchant definition displaces the law merchant concept, that concept is
inapplicable.65 Even if the law merchant and Code merchant concepts
62. See, e.g., Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965). See also
U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2. See generally Ewart, What is the Law Merchant? 3 COLUM. L. REV.
135 (1903).
63. Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, -, 395 S.W.2d 555, 557 (1965).
64. Those who by occupation hold themselves out as having knowledge of business practices
or of goods include more persons than dealers, with whom the law merchant was primarily con-
cerned. See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text.
65. Llewellyn cautioned:
12rhe deinitions laid down in this Code are not 'dictionary" defnitions. They don't tell
people how to think. They don't tell people how to write. They don't even tell people
ow to write contracts. What they do is to say what, in this Code, these words mean
when they are found in this Code ....
I N.Y. HEARINGS supra note 15, at 168 (emphasis added). Further, as Mentschikoff noted:
The Code was drafted on the basis of recurrent typical factual situations in commercial
life and on an appraisal of the desirable rules for the regulation of those situations; so
that... proper construction of the Code does not lie in movement from the prior law to
the section or sections dealing with the same problem. Such a movement does not repre-
sent the manner of its draftin; and can lead to very queer and inadequate results because
it leaves things out or brings m problems of construction which are nonexistent when the
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were congruous, the advent of futures trading as the chief means of
selling farm crops has arguably expanded the farmer class enough to
bring it within the Code merchant definition.
66
A related reason courts have given for holding that farmers are not
merchants is that the merchant class includes dealers who, by defini-
tion, both buy and sell. Because a farmer only sells his crops, he is not
a dealer and, consequently, according to some courts, not a merchant.67
The problem with this argument is that persons other than dealers,
such as manufacturers, hold themselves out as having knowledge of the
business practice described in section 2-201(2). Thus it seems clear that
the Code merchant definition is not synonymous with dealer.68
Another reason that farmers have been held not to be merchants
within section 2-201(2) is that farmers are casual sellers in that they sell
crops only once a year.69 Comment 1 to the merchant definition con-
trasts a merchant with a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer.70 The
implication of the comment is that a casual seller does not hold himself
out as having some specific knowledge. One court, however, refuted
this reasoning by noting: "A sale of 75,000 bushels of corn for a total
price in excess of $212,000 is not a 'casual sale.' "71 Nor, as has been
demonstrated, are farmers inexperienced in this type of transaction.
Another court concluded: "The marketing of a crop is as important to
the farmers as the raising of it.
' 72
Still a different approach to the problem has been taken. One court
barred a farmer from asserting the Statute of Frauds while, at the same
time, holding that the farmer was not a merchant.73 The court held
that the oral contract was enforceable against the farmer under the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel. This conclusion, however, ignores the fact
that merchant status is predicated on a doctrine not unlike estoppel.
The following analysis reveals the truth of this statement. "An estoppel
arises where man has done some act which the policy of the law will
not permit him to. . .deny."' 74 Where a person makes a representa-
Code is properly approached as an independent unit affording a new start to the courts
on its own policy bases.
MENTSCHIKOFF, supra note 47, at 8.
66. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965).
68. See notes 16-22 supra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, -, 321 So. 2d 199, 202 (1975).
70. U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 1.
71. Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. RaP. SERV. 52, 59 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
72. Kimball County Grain Coop. v. Yung, 200 Neb. 233, -, 263 N.W.2d 818, 822 (1978).,
73. Decatur Coop. Ass'n. v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976).
74. BALLEzmNE'S LAW DICTIONARY 421 (3d ed. 1969).
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tion that misleads another to such other person's detriment, the doc-
trine of estoppel applies. Thus, by entering certain kinds of
transactions, such as the selling of crops on the futures market, a farmer
will ordinarily be understood to hold himself out as having standard
knowledge of the business practices involved in the transaction. 75 The
Code merchant sections hold persons to the representations they make
by occupation.76 The underlying rationale is commercial necessity:
"Between commercial men. . . a continuing sense of reliance and se-
curity. . . is an important feature of the bargain. 77
Finally, some courts have decided that a farmer is a merchant for
purposes of section 2-201(2), but for the wrong reasons-because of his
knowledge of his crops.78 This construction ignores the context in
which the farmer-merchant issue arises. Section 2-201(2) describes and
governs a business practice, the sending of a written confirmation.
Thus, the type of merchant subject to the section is a person whose
merchant status is derived from knowledge of that business practice,
not from knowledge of goods.
V. CONCLUSION
The merchant sections of article 2 are intended to implement a
policy of holding persons to reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in their trades. The merchant sections implement this policy on
two levels. General merchant sections hold persons to reasonable-but
unspecified-conduct as measured by commercial standards. More
specific merchant sections hold persons to observance of definite com-
mercial practices, which are set out in those sections, when those per-
sons hold themselves out by their occupations as having knowledge of
those practices.
If courts will heed the underlying policy of the Code merchant
sections, the merchant cases will become consistent. By observing this
policy, courts will know what kind of representation, whether of goods
or of a business practice, the merchant section in dispute calls for.
They will, therefore, know which part of the merchant definition to
apply. Courts, in other words, will then know to accord merchant sta-
75. The duty imposed on merchants is also similar to the tort negligence standard of care
required of professionals. "[B]y undertaking to render [professional] services. . . he will ordina-
rily be understood to hold himself out as having standard professional skill and knowledge." W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 162 (4th ed. 1971).
76. See notes 17-22 s.pra and accompanying text.
77. U.C.C. § 2-609, comment 1.
78. See, ,g., Nelson v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352 (rex. 1977).
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tus when a person holds himself out by his occupation as having the
requisite knowledge called for by the merchant section, that is, when
the requisite knowledge is a usage of his trade.
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